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CASENOTES
THE ESTABLISHED STANDARD FOR FATHERS WHO HAVE
ACKNOWLEDGED PATERNITY AND ARE SEEKING
CUSTODY OF THEIR ILLEGITIMATE CHILD(REN):
ROSERO v. BLAKE, 357 N.C. 193 (2003).
BARTINA L. EDWARDS*
INTRODUCTION
This casenote examines the holding in Rosero v. Blake', and its po-
tential effects, when the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
apply the common-law presumption applied in Jolly v. Queen.2 In
Rosero, the Supreme Court clarified the standard applicable when a
father seeks custody of his illegitimate children after acknowledging
paternity under section 110-132(a)3 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, instead of legitimating the children under Chapter 49 of the
North Carolina General Statutes.4 The Supreme Court held that the
appropriate standard to be applied is the "best interest of the child"
standard.' This "best interest of the child" standard directs the courts
to award custody based on what will promote the best interest and
welfare of the child.
The standard that was applied prior to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Rosero was expressed in Jolly v. Queen.6 In Jolly, decided in 1965,
the father of an illegitimate child did not have equal standing with the
mother.' The standard applied in Jolly was the common-law presump-
tion that a mother's right to custody of an illegitimate child is superior
to that of the father.' It was said that the mother's right to general
custody would not be denied except by a showing of her unfitness as a
* Third-year law student, North Carolina Central University School of Law (Durham,
North Carolina 2004).
1. Rosero v. Blake, 581 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 2003).
2. Jolly v. Queen, 142 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. 1965)(recognizing the common-law presumption
where the mother's right to custody of an illegitimate child is superior to that of the father).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-132(a) (2001).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1, to -15 (2001).
5. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 50.
6. Jolly, 142 S.E.2d at 596.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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parent or of other special circumstances. 9 Furthermore, it was estab-
lished in Jolly that a father had rights to custody only if he had legiti-
mated the child before a hearing on custody took place.10
However, Conley v. Johnson" established that where an acknowl-
edgment of paternity was executed in writing, or where paternity was
established judicially, the rights, duties, and obligations of the mother
and father, with regard to the support and custody of the child, were
the same; and these rights, duties and obligations could be determined
and enforced in the same manner as if the child were the legitimate
child of the father and mother. "When paternity has been established,
the father becomes responsible for medical expenses incident to the
pregnancy and the birth of the child. Based on this provision, the
court will apply the 'best interest of the child' standard by the prepon-
derance of the evidence where paternity has been established."12
In Conley, the court declared that the natural father of a child born
out of wedlock was entitled to seek visitation with the child. 3 The
court reasoned this was the case under statutory law and case law. As
it relates to statutory law, the court referred to N.C. Gen. Stat. section
50-13.114 that permits "any parent" to commence an action for cus-
tody of a child. The court found that this statute applied to both legit-
imate and illegitimate children, and the principle of the statute applied
to visitation and custody. As a result, there was some confusion
around the application of the statute, as it related to illegitimate chil-
dren; and a father's custody rights were unclear until the Supreme
Court's ruling in Rosero.15
While Rosero clarified the standard to be applied in a custody case
where an acknowledged father seeks custody of his illegitimate child,
the Supreme Court's ruling raised another issue among those in the
legal community. One important issue is whether the distinction be-
tween acknowledging paternity and legitimation is necessary when de-
termining an acknowledged father's parental rights. An
acknowledged father is one who has formally acknowledged paternity
by filing an Affidavit of Parentage with the appropriate court. This
issue shall be addressed in greater detail in the discussion section of
this casenote.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Conley v. Johnson, 210 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-15, 50-13.2(b) (2001). See also Conley v. Johnson, 210 S.E.2d 88
(N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
13. Conley, 210 S.E.2d at 90.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (2001). See also Dellinger v. Bollinger, 89 S.E.2d 592 (N.C.
1955).
15. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 43-45.
2004]
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THE CASE
The history of the Rosero case is as follows: the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded an order granting perma-
nent legal custody to the father, entered on January 2, 2001, nunc pro
tunc, December 12, 2000, by Judge Anne Salisbury in District Court,
Wake County. As a result, the plaintiff father, Daniel Fabricio
Rosero, appealed from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals. 16 On August 15, 2002, the Supreme Court allowed the fa-
ther's petition for discretionary review, and the case was heard in the
Supreme Court on March 10, 2003.
Plaintiff father, Daniel Fabricio Rosero (hereinafter "Daniel"), and
Defendant mother, Lisa Blake (hereinafter "Lisa"), are the biological
parents of Kayla Alexandria Rosero (hereinafter "Kayla"). Kayla
was born on March 20, 1996. Kayla's biological parents had a brief
relationship in 1995 when the plaintiff lived in North Carolina. In De-
cember of 1995, Daniel moved to Oklahoma. After Kayla was born,
Daniel agreed to submit to a paternity test that confirmed he was
Kayla's biological father. In addition, on March 3, 1997, Daniel ac-
knowledged paternity by signing a "Father's Acknowledgment of Pa-
ternity" form that was prepared in accordance with the North
Carolina General Statute section 110-132(a). 17 Daniel and Lisa
agreed that Kayla would remain in Lisa's care and Daniel would pay
child support. On several occasions, Kayla traveled to Oklahoma to
visit her father, and she stayed with him. Daniel also maintained reg-
ular contact with Kayla by visiting North Carolina, by calling on the
telephone and by writing letters.
At the time this case was presented, Lisa had two minor sons, and
their father had begun to develop a relationship with Kayla. Lisa's
grandmother and mother were instrumental in caring for all three
children.
While in Oklahoma, Daniel, Kayla's biological father, filed for cus-
tody. Lisa responded with a counterclaim for custody based on a best
interest standard. Prior to the custody hearing, Daniel and his wife
moved to North Carolina where the trial court heard from both par-
ties. The trial court determined both parents were fit and awarded
primary custody to Daniel, the father. The court awarded secondary
custody to the mother, Lisa.
16. Rosero v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
17. Section 110-132(a) (provides for an Affidavit of Parentage in lieu of or in conclusion of
any legal proceeding instituted to establish paternity, and once executed, it shall constitute an
admission of paternity having the same legal effect as a judgment of paternity for the purpose of
establishing a child support obligation).
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In addition to some jurisdictional issues raised by Lisa, she appealed
the trial court's order. Lisa argued that the trial court applied an im-
proper standard in determining who was entitled to custody of Kayla.
Lisa based her argument on the standard applied in Jolly18 . She as-
serted the common-law presumption and contended that the trial
court had to find her to be unfit or otherwise unable to care for Kayla
before it could apply the "best interest of the child" standard. Fur-
thermore, quoting from Jolly, she argued "the mother of an illegiti-
mate child is presumed to have a superior right to custody of her child
as against all others, including the child's putative father."19 Although
others may offer more material advantages in life for the child; where
the father has not legitimated, the father may defend only on the
grounds that the mother, by reason of character or special circum-
stances, is unfit or unable to have the care of her child.2" Daniel, the
father, argued that the trial court applied the proper standard. After
much discussion about the legitimation statutes as compared to N.C.
Gen. Stat. section 110-132(a), the Court of Appeals held that in apply-
ing the canon of construction, "expression unius est exclusion alter-
ius", the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, the
general assembly, by specifying certain procedures to confer parental
status upon the putative father of an illegitimate child, necessarily ex-
cluded other procedures. For this reason, the court determined the
father's execution of documents pursuant to the child support provi-
sions of section 110-132(a) did not erase the common-law presump-
tion in favor of Lisa, the mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court should have applied the common-law presumption
as the proper standard, and the case was reversed and remanded.
Judge Walker dissented from the portion of the majority's opinion
that held the trial court applied an improper standard in determining
who should have custody of Kayla. Judge Walker stated, "in my opin-
ion, the cumulative impact of the decisions handed down by the U.S.
Supreme Court and our own Supreme Court, along with laws enacted
by our legislature since Jolly, has been the abrogation of the common-
law presumption that as between the mother and father of an illegiti-
mate child, the mother is presumed to have superior right to cus-
tody."' 2 1 Judge Walker went on to say, "furthermore this Court, in
Conley v. Johnson, specifically recognized the abrogation of the com-
mon-law principle that the father of an illegitimate child is not entitled
to visitation privileges absent consent of the mother. The fact that
18. Jolly, 142 S.E.2d at 592.
19. Id. at 596.
20. Id.
21. Rosero, 563 S.E.2d at 255-56, 258.
2004]
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plaintiff has failed to file the documents necessary to 'legitimate'
Kayla should only be one factor to consider in whether he has as-
sumed the responsibilities of parenthood. To establish a prerequisite
for the enjoyment of constitutional protections simply raises form
over substance and relegates plaintiff father to the status of a third
party despite the absence of any dispute concerning his paternity of
Kayla."22
Judge Walker agreed with the trial court that the proper standard to
apply in this case was the "best interest of the child" standard because
the common-law presumption in favor of the mother had been abro-
gated by statute. In addition, Judge Walker concluded that the case
should be remanded for more detailed findings, as the trial court's
findings were not supported by competent evidence.
The questions presented for review by the Supreme Court were: 1)
whether the North Carolina common-law rule that custody of an ille-
gitimate child presumptively vests in the mother has been abrogated
by statutory and case law, and 2) whether the presumption violated
the federal and state Constitutions.2 3 The common-law presumption
in favor of the mother of an illegitimate child stems in part from an
issue peculiar to the illegitimate child's situation - uncertainty as to
the identity of the father of the child. When a child is born to a mar-
ried woman, her husband is legally presumed to be the child's father.24
Whereas, a putative father is the alleged or reputed father of a child
born out of wedlock.25 Thus, in the latter situation, the identity of the
father of a child born out of wedlock is presumed to be uncertain or
unknown.
In reviewing the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court
referenced that under early North Carolina common-law, an illegiti-
mate child was "nullius filius", a child of no one. The law recognized
no one as the child's father. There was not a distinction between a
reputed father and an admitted father.26 The mother's paramount
right to custody was based upon the frequent doubt as to the identity
of the child's father, and the fact that the mother, nearest in interest
and affection, would best promote the child's welfare. In examining
the application of common-law, the court cited to the N.C. Gen. Stat.
section 4-1(2001), which promulgates that common-law shall apply
when that "which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in
part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete,[is] hereby declared
22. Id. at 256.
23. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 41.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12.1 (2001).
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 43 (quoting Allen v. Hunnicutt, 52 S.E.2d 18,19 (N.C. 1949)).
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to be in full force within this [s]tate. '' 27 Thus, unless the common-law
presumption recognizing a preference for maternal custody of an ille-
gitimate child had been abrogated, a putative father was on unequal
footing with the mother, unless the father had legitimated the child
pursuant to statute or through legitimacy proceedings as provided for
in Chapter 49.28
In 1955, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a putative
father was a "parent" as defined by North Carolina's general custody
statutes in effect at that time.29 Yet, while a putative father could
maintain an action for custody under N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-13,
the court confirmed as late as 1965 that to be awarded custody, the
putative father had to still overcome the common-law presumption for
awarding custody in favor of the mother. In other words, the father
remained on unequal footing with the mother, and the mother's para-
mount right to custody would yield only to a finding that she was an
unfit custodian of bad character or other, special circumstances. The
Rosero Court clearly set out the landscape for the law governing child
custody, the rights of putative fathers, and the rights of illegitimate
children. However, these laws changed drastically after Jolly.
In 1967, the general assembly repealed all prior statutes governing
custody of minor children and enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. sections 50-13.1
to -13.8, a statutory scheme under which all child custody actions may
be brought. Section 50-13.1 states that "any parent claiming the right
to custody of a minor child may institute an action for the custody of
such child."'30 The court in Conley determined there was nothing in
this section that limited custody proceedings to the parent of a legiti-
mate child.
Against this historical background, The Rosero Court continued to
explain that when enacted, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-13.2(b) directed
the trial courts to award custody based upon what "will best promote
the interest and welfare of the child. Between the mother and the
father, whether natural or adoptive, there is no presumption as to who
will better promote the interest and welfare of the child. " During
the same year, the general assembly adopted N.C. Gen. Stat. sections
49-14,-5, and -16, abrogating common law.32 As a result, an illegiti-
mate child's father was allowed to bring a judicial action establishing
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2001) (last amended in 1778).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1, to -15 (2001).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950)(repealed 1967); See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1
(2001).
30. § 50-13.1 (2001).
31. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 45 (citing to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(a),(b)).
32. Conley, 210 S.E.2d 89, 90 (quoting 3 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 251 (Supp.
1974).
2004]
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paternity. In addition, section 49-15, which sets out the support and
custody rights and obligations for both parents, has not been amended
since its enactment in 1967. Moreover, in Dellinger,33 the court held
that common-law had been abrogated by case law and statutory law.
It appears that the definition of "parent" in Dellinger included both
legitimate and illegitimate parents. Here, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the illegitimate child's father was entitled to all rights, du-
ties, and obligations as was a parent under North Carolina Statutes
governing custody disputes.34
In addition to the legislative changes acknowledged by the Court of
Appeals in Conley, the North Carolina General Assembly
has continually enacted and modified legislation to establish legal ties
binding illegitimate children to their biological fathers and to acknowl-
edge the rights and privileges inherent in the relationship between fa-
ther and child. These provisions operate even where the father
acknowledges paternity but fails to have his child judicially legitimated
or fails to seek judicial determination of paternity. 35
The word "acknowledgment", as used in cases and statutes that pro-
vide for establishing paternity by the father, typically means disclosing
facts of paternity in writing and/or verbally to relatives, friends, ac-
quaintances and others, holding the child out as his own3 6 . In North
Carolina, a father may establish paternity, formally, in accordance
with section 110-132(a), which includes the filing of the "Father's Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity", or the father may establish paternity in
accordance with section 49-14, which establishes a procedure to estab-
lish paternity and legitimate. The father in Rosero availed himself of
the former method, filing an Acknowledgment of Paternity. In con-
trast to Jolly, the Supreme Court found the following statutes relevant
because they allow certain rights when the putative father has estab-
lished paternity by "acknowledgement:"
1) N.C. Gen. Stat. section 7B-1111(a)(5)(2001) - provides that paren-
tal rights of an illegitimate child's biological father cannot be termi-
nated where the father has established or acknowledged paternity
based upon any one of the four enumerated methods;
2) N.C. Gen. Stat. section 29-19 (b)(2), (c) (2001) - since Jolly, there
was a change in this statute which governs intestate succession
where the child is illegitimate; this section was amended in 1973
and confers the same rights for illegitimate children as legitimate
children. Once there is proper adjudication or acknowledgment of
paternity, illegitimate children today are entitled to inherit from
33. Dellinger v. Bollinger, 89 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. 1955).
34. Id.
35. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 46.
36. Tracy Cashman, When is a Biological Father Really a Dad?, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 959 (1977).
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their fathers and his relatives, and their fathers are entitled to in-
herit from them, even though they have not been legitimated;
3) N.C. Gen. Stat. section 48-3-601(2)(b) (2001) - provides that con-
sent of illegitimate children's fathers who acknowledge paternity is
now required for their adoption.
Thus, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. section 110-132(a) merely
provide another method for the formal acknowledgment of paternity.
This statute sets forth that
in lieu of or in conclusion of any legal proceeding instituted to estab-
lish paternity, the written acknowledgment of paternity executed by
the putative father of the dependent child when accompanied by a
written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by the mother
of the dependent child shall have the same force and effect as a
judgment. 37
The Court held that given the changes in North Carolina's laws that
govern familial relationships, the Court of Appeals improperly relied
on Jolly. In Jolly, the relationship of the father to his illegitimate child
was governed by the strict common-law doctrine of nullius filius,
which dictated the presumption that custody of the illegitimate child
vested in the mother. In addition, the Supreme Court disagreed with
the Court of Appeals' majority that indicated the numerous changes
to the law discussed above were a patchwork of abrogations to the
common-law and therefore the common-law presumption was still the
law in North Carolina. The majority in the Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the differences between sections 110-132(a) and 49-14 sup-
port its conclusion that the presumption still exists.
However, the Supreme Court found the differences and the diver-
gent purposes underlying the article in which the N.C. Gen. Stat. sec-
tion 110-132(a) is contained, to provide child support and N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 49-14 to determine paternity, irrelevant.38 The legislative
intent of the "comprehensive" statutes addressing the child welfare
should be the paramount consideration. "The court further noted that
it construes multiple statutes governing a single subject in pari materia
to effectuate legislative intent and to harmonize them into one law on
the subject."'39 As espoused by the Supreme Court, the effects of ac-
knowledging paternity, a judicial determination of paternity, and legit-
imation proceedings are similar. The legitimate child is able to inherit
by and through the father, the father is able to inherit from his child,
and the father's consent is needed for adoption.
The Supreme Court also noted that the Court of Appeals' majority
found support for its conclusion in the distinction between the high
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-132(a).
38. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 48.
39. Id. (quoting Brown v. Flowe, 507 S.E.2d 894,896 (N.C. 1998)).
2004]
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standard for establishing paternity judicially under section 49-14, by
clear and convincing evidence, compared to the complete lack of stan-
dard for acknowledging paternity in section 110-132(a). Moreover,
the acknowledgment could be rescinded, while the judicial determina-
tion of paternity was absolute. According to the Court of Appeals,
these distinctions indicated that a father acknowledging paternity
under section 110-132(a) was not on equal footing with the father who
had received a judicial determination of paternity. The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned the maternal-preference presumption still applied to
the detriment of the father who acknowledged paternity under N.C.
Gen. Stat. section 110-132(a).
However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court quoted section 110-132(a) that sets forth, "in lieu
of or in conclusion of any legal proceeding instituted to establish pa-
ternity, the written acknowledgment of paternity executed by the pu-
tative father of the dependent child when accompanied by a written
affirmation of paternity executed and sworn by the mother of the de-
pendent child shall have the same force and effect as a judgment. 40
Moreover, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals by
espousing that although section 110-132(a) does not provide for a
modicum of proof of paternity, it does require, in the current version,
and the version in effect for the case, that the child's mother affirm
that the acknowledging father is in fact the natural father. Such a re-
quirement prevents a man from "simply declaring his paternity of a
child unilaterally and easily filing for a court order approving his ac-
knowledgment and agreement to support. ' 41 Furthermore, the Court
advocated that whether the affirmation of paternity can be rescinded
is irrelevant. At the time custody is adjudicated, a father who affirms
his paternity pursuant to section 110-132(a) and pays child support in
conjunction with that affirmation is acting consistent with his right to
care for and have control of the child. The Supreme Court further
noted that at the time Jolly was decided, sections 49-1 to -9 provided
the exclusive remedy for collecting support for an illegitimate child.42
The court in its discussion went further and stated that "given the
legal relationship between fathers and their illegitimate children now
existing by virtue of certain statutory enactions, we believe that the
legislatures' 1977 modifications to N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-13.2(a)
represent an express abrogation of the common-law presumption at
issue in the present case."'43 To determine whether N.C. Gen. Stat.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-132(a).
41. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 49.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 49.
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section 50-13.2(a) abrogated the presumption at issue, the Court ex-
amined its plain language. It is well settled that when the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial con-
struction and the courts must give it is plain meaning." Therefore, the
Court concluded that, by its plain language, the statute clearly abro-
gated the common-law presumption vesting custody of an illegitimate
child, in the child's mother. The Court held that applying N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 50-13.2(a) in such a manner is not only dictated by its
plain language, but also ensures that the best interest of the child, ille-
gitimate or legitimate, not the relationship, or lack thereof, between
natural or adoptive parents, is the district court's paramount concern.
For as between natural or adoptive parents, "the welfare of the child
has always been the polar star which guides the courts in awarding
custody."45 The Supreme Court cited to several courts in sister states
that have applied this Court's same reasoning to find the common-law
presumption for awarding custody in favor of the illegitimate child's
mother is no longer applicable. In addition, these sister states gave
varying degrees of consideration to the method by which the father
acknowledged or established paternity. As a result, the Supreme
Court held that a father's right to custody of an illegitimate child is
legally equal to that of the child's mother, and is dictated by section
50-13.2. Thus, if the best interest of the child is served by placing the
child in the father's custody, he is to be awarded custody of that child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order awarding custody
of Kayla to plaintiff, Daniel. The court did not address the Constitu-
tional issue of whether the common-law presumption violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States and North Carolina
Constitutions because it determined that the presumption had been
abrogated by statute. The court cited Anderson v. Assimos,46 "noting
that the courts of this state will avoid constitutional questions, even if
properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other
grounds."47 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion and remanded to the District Court, Wake County to reinstate
the trial court's order.
44. Id.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-13.2(a) (2001). ("an order for custody must include findings of fact
which support the determination of what is in the best interest of the child. Between the mother
and the father, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall apply as to who will better
promote the interest and welfare of the child").
46. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 572 S.E.2d 101,102 (N.C. 2002)
(per curium)(noting "the courts of this state will avoid constitutional questions, even if properly
presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds").
47. Id.
20041
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DISCUSSION
I. Acknowledgment of Paternity versus Legitimation: Is this
distinction still needed when determining the parental rights
of acknowledged fathers?
While Rosero upheld the father's custody rights based on an Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity and applied the "best interest of the child
standard", the Court maintained a general distinction between pater-
nity and legitimation. Yet, the Court carved out the distinction as it
related to custody, and recognized several rights that attach when a
father acknowledges paternity in North Carolina. Thus, this raises the
issue of whether the distinction between acknowledged paternity and
legitimation when determining an acknowledged father's parental
rights is still needed. Do the "exceptions" of rights conveyed by an
acknowledgment of paternity swallow the "rule" of rights conveyed by
legitimation? This section of the casenote shall address this issue of
distinction as it compares acknowledgment of paternity and legitima-
tion against the historical background to the present.
Paternity is not synonymous with legitimacy in that paternity relates
to the biological relationship between a man and child, whereas legiti-
macy relates to the legal relationship of father to child.48 Procedur-
ally, it is the subsequent marriage or the judicial acknowledgment of
paternity, as contrasted to establishment of paternity based on "actual
parentage," that renders a child born out of wedlock legitimate.
Legitimation confers upon the father and mother all of the lawful
parental privileges and rights, as well as all of the obligations which
parents owe to their lawful issue, just as if the child had been born in
wedlock.4 9 Legitimation has been held to be more than paternity; it is
a status that entitles the child to take real and personal property by
succession, inheritance and distribution, just as if the child had been
born in wedlock. 0 Whereas, an adjudication of paternity, on the
other hand, only serves to equalize between the child's father and
mother, "the rights, duties, and obligations, with regard to support
and custody of the child.51 However, in Rosero, it was noted that a
child whose father had acknowledged paternity was entitled to these
same rights by statute; and the father could inherit from the child.
While statutory law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, an ille-
gitimate child's father typically has fewer rights if the child is not legit-
imated as compared to a paternity determination. While paternity
48. Ellis v. Bennett, 10 S.W.3d 922 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-11 (setting forth the effects of legitimation).
50. Smith v. Barbour, 571 S.E.2d 877 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
51. Id.
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may suffice as it relates to some parental rights such as custody and
child support, in most jurisdictions, paternity is not enough to vest full
legal rights in the father. Historically, the biological father of an ille-
gitimate child had no rights. Yet, as discussed below, in North Caro-
lina, legitimation is becoming less of a conveyance of rights and more
akin to a status. Several North Carolina statutes, independent of legit-
imation, confer rights upon an acknowledged father who has formally
acknowledged paternity. In Rosero, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held the father, who had not legitimated, but who had acknowl-
edged paternity, was on equal footing with the mother, and a "best
interest in the child" standard is to be applied when making a determi-
nation regarding custody.52 The Court held that the common-law pre-
sumption was abrogated by statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-
13.2(a).53
Notwithstanding the standard that applies, in most jurisdictions,
both biological parents are equally responsible for the financial wel-
fare of the child. The biological father of an illegitimate child is no
longer excused from supporting a child.54 Once paternity has been
established, the same child support standards for legitimate children
apply to illegitimate children. As it relates to financial support, the
courts have refused to make a distinction between paternity, legitima-
tion, legitimate or illegitimate classifications. Thus, once the identity
of the father is established, as it relates to support, all else is
irrelevant.
Moreover, it has been noted by the courts that certain rights have
been granted by statute, to fathers who have acknowledged paternity.
In addition to custody and child support rights, as established in
Rosero, the following rights and benefits are now available to the fa-
ther, the child or both, once paternity has been acknowledged:
1) Inheritance, succession and distribution. Pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. sections 29-19(b)(2),(c)(2001), a father may inherit from his
illegitimate child through intestate succession, upon a filed ac-
knowledgment of paternity with the court. In addition, section 31-
5.5(2001) entitles afterborn illegitimate children to devises under
the biological father's will; and section 28A-22-2 sets forth that dis-
tribution of shares to after-born children apply to illegitimate after-
born children;
2) Termination of parental rights. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. section
7B-1111(a)(5)(2001), parental rights of an illegitimate child's bio-
logical father may not be terminated where the father has estab-
lished or acknowledged paternity based on any one of the four
52. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 49.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a)
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (2001).
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enumerated methods. Only two of the methods involve legitima-
tion; and,
3) Workers' Compensation and Special Death Benefits. Pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 97 -2 (12) (2001), an illegitimate child who
has been acknowledged by the father, may receive benefits pursu-
ant to the workers' compensation laws; and pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 143-166.2(a)(2001), illegitimate children are included
in the definition of a dependent child for the purpose of allowing
these children to receive death benefits if the fathers were em-
ployed as North Carolina law enforcement officers, firemen, or res-
cue squad workers.
Thus, by acknowledging paternity, without legitimation, a father
and child currently are entitled to receive parental rights and benefits
once reserved for "the legitimate." Furthermore, as acknowledged by
the Court of Appeals in Conley, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly has continually enacted and modified legislation that establishes
legal bonds attaching illegitimate children to their biological fathers.
These statutes acknowledge the rights and privileges that are inherent
in a father-child relationship.
Yet, notwithstanding these similarities and acknowledgments of
rights between a father who has acknowledged paternity compared to
the father who has legitimated, North Carolina continues to distin-
guish between acknowledged paternity and legitimation when grant-
ing unlimited parental rights to an acknowledged father. Paternity
and Legitimation are not mutually exclusive. The same or similar
benefits flow from each. The legislative intent of the legitimation stat-
ute, to establish the identity of the father and prevent the child from
becoming a public charge, is met when acknowledging paternity or
legitimating. Therefore, to maintain different requirements, a differ-
ent status and different standards for acknowledged paternity and le-
gitimation, a "form over substance" line of reasoning seems to take
shape.
Chapter 49 of the North Carolina General Statutes governs legiti-
mation of illegitimate children. For purposes of this continued analy-
sis of whether a distinction between paternity and legitimation is
necessary, the focus in this section shall be on establishing paternity
under section 49-14 as compared to establishing paternity under sec-
tion 110-132(a). Both statutes involve an establishment of paternity,
however they differ in procedure and conveyance of rights. Section
49-14 allows for the establishment of paternity while conferring a le-
gitimation status. Section 110-132(a) only allows for an acknowledg-
ment of paternity.
In North Carolina, there are primarily two formal methods to estab-
lish paternity:
13
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1) in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. section 110-132(a), and 2) in
accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. section 49-14. Section 110-132(a)
sets forth the requirements for an acknowledgment of paternity
and is entitled "Acknowledgment Affidavit of Paternity Parentage
and Agreement to Support". Subsection (a) states, " in lieu of or in
conclusion of any legal proceeding instituted to establish paternity,
the written acknowledgment affidavits of paternity parentage exe-
cuted by the putative father of the dependent child when accompa-
nied by a written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by
the mother of the dependent child and filed with and approved by
a judge or the district court in the county where the mother of the
child resides or is found, or in the county where the putative father
resides or is found, or in the county where the child resides or is
found shall constitute an admission of paternity and shall have the
same force and legal effect as a judgment of that court; and a pater-
nity for the purpose of establishing a child support obligation...,55
Whereas, section 49-14 entitled, "Civil Action to Establish Pater-
nity" sets forth the requirements for establishing paternity in order to
have the effect of legitimation. However, it is not the establishment of
paternity under this section that conveys legitimation status, but the
civil action allowing for a judicial determination based on proof of
paternity by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. The statute is
clear to separate paternity from legitimation and states that the estab-
lishment of paternity does not have the effect of legitimation. Pro-
ceedings for paternity may be brought by the mother, the father, the
child or the personal representative of the mother or the child. The
proceeding may also be brought by the director of social services
when the child or mother is likely to become a public charge. For
purposes of jurisdiction, the act of sexual intercourse within North
Carolina constitutes sufficient minimum contact for an action for pa-
ternity for a child conceived as a result of such act.56
Under paternity proceedings, in accordance with section 49-14,
proof of paternity must be by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
If an action to establish paternity is brought more than 3 years after
the death of the putative father or more than three years after the
birth of the child, paternity shall not be established in a contested case
without evidence from a blood or genetic test.5 7
In addition to section 49-14, which establishes paternity and may
legitimate by a civil action, to legitimate in North Carolina, the father
may avail himself of the following statutes:
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-132(a).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-17(a) (2001).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (2001).
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1) Section 49-10, which establishes procedures for the putative father
to legitimate his illegitimate child by filing a written petition in Supe-
rior Court. Mother and Child are "necessary parties to the proceed-
ing," which allows legitimation when "it appears to the court that the
petitioner is the father of the child." The court may then declare and
pronounce the child legitimated;
2) Section 49-12, which provides for automatic legitimation of a child
upon the marriage of the putative father to the illegitimate child's
mother; and
3) Section 49-12.1 sets out the procedure for legitimation of a child
whose mother is married to someone other than the putative father.
The putative father may overcome the presumption of legitimacy aris-
ing from the mother's marriage by "clear & convincing evidence."
Upon compliance with the provisions of any of the above-refer-
enced legitimation statutes, the putative father of an illegitimate child
achieves the legal status equal to that of the child's mother. For exam-
ple, pursuant to section 49-11, upon legitimation, "the father shall
have all of the lawful parental privileges and rights to the same extent
as if said child had been born in wedlock.""8
Moreover, section 49-15 provides that "after the establishment of
paternity of an illegitimate child pursuant to 49-14, the rights, duties &
obligations of the mother and father so established, with regard to
support and custody of the child shall be the same. . . 59 Thus, only
after the putative father legitimates his child according to statutory
provisions, or submits to a judicial determination of paternity, will he
stand on an equal footing with the mother, as it relates to full parental
rights. Moreover, if a child has been legitimated in accordance with
Chapter 49 of the North Carolina General Statutes, there is no basis
for filing a proceeding for paternity.
While Chapter 49 sets out the legitimation requirements, the issue
remains as to whether there is a need for the distinction between legit-
imation and acknowledgment of paternity for purposes of allowing an
acknowledged father to receive full parental rights. The legislative
purpose of an action under section 49-14 is to establish the identity of
the biological father of an illegitimate child so that the child's right to
support may be enforced, and the child will not become a public
charge.6 ° Moreover, it was stated in Becton61 that the legislative pur-
pose underlying section 49-14 is to provide the basis or means of es-
tablishing the identity of the putative father in order to allow the
courts to impose an obligation of support.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-11 (2001).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 49-15.
60. Smith v. Price, 328 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
61. Becton v. George, 369 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
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The paternity statutes vary in their requirements to show certainty
of paternity. On one hand, it could be argued that the reason for the
differences in procedure and requirements is that the general assem-
bly intended to exclude paternity from legitimation and therefore the
rights were intended to be different under each. However, other stat-
utes have been enacted providing the same or similar rights. There-
fore, this is not necessarily consistent or reconcilable.
In addition, each statute, section 49-14 and section 110-132(a), re-
quires some proof of paternity. If one of the arguments against re-
moving the distinction is based on differences in the degree of proof,
this places "form over substance." While formalities may serve dual
purposes, the court in Herndon,6 2 held that a written instrument ac-
knowledging paternity, executed and filed with the clerk of court is
enough to assure the requisite degree of certainty under 29-19(b)(2).63
It is the intent to establish paternity that is critical. Moreover, the
Court in Rosero addressed the issue of varying degrees of proof, when
establishing paternity under the legitimation statute 49-14 and section
110-132(a), when it espoused, "although section 110-132(a) does not
provide for even a modicum of proof of paternity, it does require, in
both the current version and the version in effect for this case, that the
child's mother affirm that the acknowledging father is in fact the natu-
ral father. Such a requirement prevents a man from 'simply declaring
his paternity of a child unilaterally and easily filing for a court order
approving his acknowledgment and agreement to support. Further-
more, whether the affirmation of paternity can be rescinded is irrele-
vant. At the time custody is adjudicated, a father who affirms his
paternity pursuant to section 110-132(a) and pays child support in
conjunction with that affirmation is acting consistent with his right to
care for and have control of the child."64 The Supreme Court in
Rosero went further to say that "given the legal relationship between
fathers and their illegitimate children now existing by virtue of certain
statutory enaction, [it] believed that the legislatures' 1977 modifica-
tions to N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-13.2(a) represent an express abro-
gation of the common-law presumption at issue in the present case. 65
The language used by the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding
care that is consistent with the father's rights to care for his child, can
62. Herndon v. Robinson, 291 S.E.2d 305(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (referencing the formalities
of 29-19(b)(2), as a method for establishing paternity, a written instrument acknowledging pater-
nity assures the requisite degree of certainty. The formalities further assure that the decedent
intended that the illegitimate child share in the estate).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(2) (2001).
64. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 49.
65. Id.
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be mapped to Stanley v. Illinois,66 where it was established that a fa-
ther has parental rights. The United States Supreme Court tempered
the expansion of Stanley by requiring that an acknowledged father ac-
tively participate, in some way, in the care and nurturing of his child in
order to establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest. While
Stanley dealt more with a father's due process protection of his inter-
est, it is important to note that the court acknowledged he had an
interest. "The inherent value of the parent-child relationship, the im-
portance of the responsibilities surrounding parenting, and the contin-
ued reliance on the institution of marriage to assist in defining legal
issues all help to create boundaries which define the unwed father's
liberty interest in his relationship with his child."67 In Rosero, the fa-
ther attempted to avail himself of a "normal" father's rights by ac-
knowledging paternity instead of legitimating. Thus, based on the
holding in Rosero, if a court takes the position that this plaintiff father
who has taken steps to support his child and acknowledge paternity is
consistent with actively participating in the care and nurturing of his
child, then, it stands to reason that the acknowledged father in Rosero
should be able to avail himself of full parental rights without having to
legitimate.
Even under a constitutional analysis, if the unwed father's right is
deemed to be limited, "the state should only intrude upon this interest
through regulations that protect the child or the health and safety of
its citizens. This interest would need to outweigh the liberty interest
of the parent-child relationship."68 However, the state's interest in
enacting the legitimation statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 49-14 is to
establish the identity of the father and prevent the child from becom-
ing a public charge, as indicated by its legislative intent. This interest
is equally met by an acknowledgment of paternity under section 110-
132(a). Therefore, the state's interest may not be sufficient to deny
full rights to a father who has actively and consistently participated in
the nurturing care of his child.
Moreover, by statute, the standard applied by the court in Rosero
was the "best interest of the child" standard, which places the issue
back in the framework of protecting the child's interest. The Court
held that the father who has acknowledged paternity is on equal foot-
66. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that a father has a limited
interest and due process prevents an unwed father from being deprived of his children without a
hearing...).
67. Id.
68. Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of his
Child by Withholding Consent: United States Supreme Court Cases Addressing Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Father, 61 A.L.R. 5th 151 (1998).
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ing with one who has legitimated.69 Thus, the child's interest, as well
as the liberty interest of the parent-child relationship is maintained.
While Rosero dealt with the custody rights, by analogy, the need for a
distinction between legitimation and acknowledged paternity to re-
ceive full parental rights remains questionable. The United States Su-
preme Court has held that the history and tradition surrounding the
function of a non-traditional family, and even an extended family ele-
vates to a level that is protected by the Constitution. Thus, when ad-
dressing the issue of whether a distinction between acknowledging
paternity and legitimation is still needed, the North Carolina General
Assembly will undoubtedly examine existing statutes, parental rights
and the constitutional ramifications of expanding or limiting these
rights.
The majority in the Court of Appeals' decision in Rosero proposed
that the general assembly intended a distinction between an acknowl-
edgment of paternity and legitimation.70 Nonetheless, if the general
assembly intends to maintain this distinction based on its original
drafting, to include certain paternity procedures while excluding other
paternity procedures, and by specifying different procedures to confer
legitimation status upon the putative father of an illegitimate child,
the legislative intent of the paternity-related statutes and the language
of the statutes need to be re-examined to ensure this outcome. In the
current state of affairs, the holding in Rosero makes it necessary to
address the issue of whether it is necessary for a father to legitimate in
order to avail himself of his full parental rights, once he has formally
acknowledged paternity. Responding in the affirmative appears to
favor form over substance based on dated social policies or a mere
lack of uniformity between statutes.
However, if all of the related statutes are deemed to be comprehen-
sive and not a patchwork of statutes, it would appear that the Court in
Rosero has provided a sufficient answer to whether a distinction is
necessary. The general assembly should be encouraged by this find-
ing, as a good beginning in re-examining the statutes relating to pater-
nity and legitimation. Even though the North Carolina Supreme
Court did not deal with the issue of full parental rights, but was
presented with the question of custody rights, the Court held that
there should not be a distinction between acknowledging paternity
and legitimation as it relates to custody.71
At least one jurisdiction has recognized the right of the father of an
illegitimate child to have custody even absent a legitimation proceed-
69. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 49.
70. Id. at 49.
71. Id.
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ing, holding that the natural father has equality of standing with the
natural mother on the custody question. While affirming an award of
custody to the child's father despite the absence of a finding of the
mother's unfitness, the court in Byrd7 2 acknowledged that "legitima-
tion of a child is always a preferred goal, but concluded that legitima-
tion should not be a prerequisite for the natural father's equality of
standing in a custody action for two reasons: (1) each of the three
methods in the jurisdiction by which a father could legitimate his
child, through an acknowledgment proceeding, an adoption, or a mar-
riage with the mother, required the consent of the mother, and there-
fore, she could thwart any attempt by the natural father to legitimate
the child; and (2) a legitimation requirement would not necessarily be
in the best interests of the child and would result in dissimilar treat-
ment between legitimate and illegitimate children.73 The court in
Rosero found that additional sister courts had applied the same rea-
soning to find the common-law presumption in favor of the illegiti-
mate child's mother no longer applicable."
In support of its finding that an acknowledgment of paternity enti-
tled the father to custody rights, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Rosero conclusively held that the common-law presumption was abro-
gated.75 This is further support for removal of the distinction as it
evidences the weakening of the distinction between acknowledgment
of paternity and legitimation. The Court relied on the plain language
rule. "When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there
is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give it its plain
and definite meaning. "76
In examining the statute in its plain language, the court held that
the statute clearly abrogated the common-law presumption vesting
custody of an illegitimate child in the child's mother.77 The court re-
lied on 50-13.2(a) to apply the "best interest of the child" standard.
The court held that "the statute dictates and ensures by its plain lan-
guage that 'the best interest of the child', illegitimate or legitimate,
both the relationship or lack thereof, between natural or adoptive par-
ents, is the district court's paramount concern. The welfare of the
child has always been the polar star which guides the courts in award-
ing custody., 78
72. In re Byrd, 421 N.E.2d 1284 (Ohio 1981).
73. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 49
74. Id. at 50.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 49.
77. Id. at 50-51.
78. Id. at 50.
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II. The "Best Interest of the Child" Standard
In completing the analysis of Rosero, notwithstanding the other is-
sues it raised as between the distinction between paternity and legiti-
mation, the critical issue in Rosero hinged on the standard to be
applied for custody as between a mother and father with an illegiti-
mate child. However, the "best interest in the child" standard could
not be applied properly until the Court was able to remove the dis-
tinction between legitimation and paternity as it related to custody
and child support. This ability to remove the distinction was based on
the statute that abrogated the common-law presumption. The Court
in its wisdom espoused that the statutes must be taken comprehen-
sively. Moreover, the Court stated that it construes statutes governing
a single subject in pari materia to effectuate legislative intent and to
harmonize them into one law on the subject.7 9
Courts have begun to consider in varying degrees, the child's best
interest within a specific situation. Such considerations have led to in-
creasing rights for a biological parent. Key factors in the best interest
standard are the maintenance of the children's current environment,
relationships, home, school, church, health, and whether their educa-
tional and emotional needs are being met. 0
However, the "best interest of the child" standard has been applied
broadly in the different areas of the law that concern children. The
standard, although articulated, is difficult to specify, and as such, has
been subject to differing definitions and interpretations. Assessing
the best interest of the child may conflict with an interpretation of
parental rights based upon biology and traditional interpretations of
the family. This point is highly relevant where an acknowledged fa-
ther's rights are in jeopardy because he does not fall within the tradi-
tional interpretation of family. This is why the holding in Rosero is so
critical to an acknowledged father who is seeking custody rights.
While the standard may be subject to some interpretation, at least the
standard has been established and applied. This application will assist
acknowledged fathers to be placed on equal footing with the mothers.
The criteria by which the mother is examined should be the same cri-
teria by which the father is being examined to determine the best in-
terest of the child. The governing statute in determining the best
interest of the child is N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50-13.2(a) which directs
the courts to award custody based upon what "will best promote the
interest and welfare of the child." As between the mother and the
79. Id. at 48 (quoting Brown v. Flowe, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (N.C. 1998)).
80. Cashman, supra note 38. See also Violence Against Women Act Manual, App. 15-1,
(Aug. 2002) (quoting Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993).
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father, whether natural or adoptive, there is no presumption as to who
will better promote the interest and welfare of the child.'
III. Constitutional Dimensions
In Troxel v. Granville,82 it was recognized that the "Due Process
Clause of the United State Constitution does not permit a state to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision
could be made. '83 The court in Rosero made note of applicable con-
stitutional issues, and granted plaintiff's petition for discretionary re-
view on the additional issue of whether the common-law presumption
that the mother of an illegitimate child retains a superior right to that
child's custody violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States and North Carolina Constitutions.' However, the court did
not deal with this issue on appeal. The Court determined that because
the presumption had been abrogated by statute, there was no need to
address whether it violated plaintiff's rights under the United States
and North Carolina Constitutions. 85
The due process and equal protection arguments are important to
unwed biological fathers because they provide the basis upon which to
challenge the standards applied by the state courts.86 The most com-
mon standards frequently applied by state courts in determining
whether they will terminate an unwed biological father's rights are: (1)
whether his actions constitute abandonment of the child, (2) whether
it is in the best interest of the child that the father's parental rights be
terminated, and (3) whether the nature of the relationship between
the father and his child is worthy of constitutional protection. '87 As
was done by the father in Rosero, many fathers argue that the termi-
nation of their parental rights violates their constitutional rights.
Courts have consistently held that there is a presumptive preference
for biological parents to assume the custody and care of children and
that the state must show a sufficient cause for any intervention with
this presumption. In response to the equal protection argument, it is
important to note that mothers have been deemed not similarly situ-
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a).
82. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 47(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51.
85. Id.
86. Cashman, supra note 38 (quoting Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-268 (1983) (find-
ing that a father failed to take available steps to establish a relationship with his child)). See also,
Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)(holding that a father's rights were entitled to
constitutional protection because he lived with the children as their father and contributed to
their financial support).
87. Id.
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ated to an unwed father who may remain anonymous unless he takes
affirmative steps to claim his child.88 However, in the case of illegiti-
mate children, where fathers have taken such steps, states have an
interest in placing children in stable homes while fathers have an in-
terest in parenting their children.89
Federal and state laws have attempted to balance these competing
interests, and courts have held that a state does not violate a father's
right to due process if it shows a compelling reason to terminate his
parental rights. Yet, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state must
afford a father due process protection of his interest in having contact
with his child when he has demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood.9"
In Rosero, the father's argument was based on the equal protection
clause rather than the due process clause of the United States and
North Carolina Constitutions. However, the Court did hold that the
father demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood.91 Federal precedent becomes important when there is
unpredictability as to a state court's action on a matter. Thus, the
father could be entitled to due process protection of his interest on the
basis of his actions of responsibility, and the "best interest of the child
standard" could be applied at that time. Therefore, should the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision be appealed, and on appeal the
statute is placed under constitutional scrutiny, or is deemed not to
have abrogated the common-law presumption, the father's constitu-
tional argument may become critically important in asserting his
rights.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Rosero established
and applied the standard to be used in cases where acknowledged fa-
thers who have acknowledged paternity are seeking custody of their
illegitimate children. However, more action on the part of the legisla-
ture may be needed to further resolve the issue of whether the distinc-
tion between legitimation and acknowledged paternity is still needed
to allow an acknowledged father full parental rights.
It has been shown that certain North Carolina statutes provide pa-
rental rights. These statutes appear to be slowly eroding the convey-
ance of rights once reserved for legitimation statutes. Parental rights
are slowly being given, statute by statute, to those fathers who ac-
88. Cashman, supra note 38, (taken from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Rosero, 581 S.E.2d at 41, 51.
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knowledge paternity as set forth in the applicable statutes. Therefore,
by removing the distinction between legitimation and acknowledged
paternity, the legislature creates uniformity and simplicity, while plac-
ing the matter within the realm of the Courts to better define these
cases using a framework based on the best interest of the child.
In contrast, by not removing the distinction, the "form over sub-
stance" argument prevails, the illegitimate child is denied a legal sta-
tus of legitimacy, and the father is denied certain parental rights, while
retaining others. The latter option seems to be farther away from
what is in the best interest of the child. With the distinction in tact,
one might say the child becomes a "moral public charge" instead of a
financial public charge.
If the paternity statutes allowed for the same procedures and a
course of legitimation for all purposes, not just custody and child sup-
port, the distinction is essentially removed. "Without such a prefer-
ence, we would simply be promoting a race to the courthouse based
on assumptions as to which judge will best decide the issue of
paternity. 92
New family formations, equal rights for mothers and fathers,
whether married or not, and an increased desire of parents to be in-
volved in their children's lives have led to conflicts over custody. The
willingness of courts to fashion remedies using inherent equitable
powers, especially for de facto parents, have allowed more persons
access to courts to litigate custody.
In contrast, if the intent is to discourage illegitimate children and to
promote the marriage of the fathers to the mothers, social policy may
be a valid reason for not removing the distinction between acknowl-
edged paternity and legitimation. However, it is difficult to legislate
morality and this intent is not apparent in the statutes. There has been
a significant demographic and social change within the United States
over the last fifty years. As a result, the states continue to have legiti-
mate interests, but these interests may need to be updated to meet the
changing realities of society. Rosero is just one indication of how the
Court found a solution to an increasingly common issue. The overall
percentage of children born outside of marriage increased over 39%
between 1990-1994.93 Currently, approximately 40% of all children
are born to unwed mothers. Thus, if the legislature's new paternity
and legitimation debate is based on social policy, it will have to ex-
amine the moral interest, the legal interest and the economic interest
in determining the state's interest and the best interest of the child.
92. Homer H. Clark, Jr., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, sec-
tion 4:3 at 174 (2d ed. 1988).
93. Leah Y. Latimer, Family Matters, in THE CRISIS (Sept/Oct 2003).
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Although the parental rights may vary in quantity, the rights
granted by legitimation vary just slightly from the rights conveyed by
acknowledged paternity actions. Thus, it will not only be good public
policy to remove the distinction between acknowledged paternity and
legitimation, as related to parental rights, but it will further judicial
efficiency.94 This distinction may be removed if the legislature
amends section 49-14 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Other
amendments may be deemed necessary to bring all statutes involving
paternity and legitimation into uniformity. However, an amendment
to section 49-14 may be enacted to remove the distinction by allowing
an adjudication of paternity to constitute a per se legitimation of the
child.
Notwithstanding any change by the legislature, however, the origi-
nal premise for the state's interest is still valid, since "the majority of
the children born out of wedlock are in a single-parent environ-
ment."95 This original premise is based on preventing illegitimate
children from becoming a public charge to the state. However, as
stated herein, this interest is currently satisfied by acknowledging pa-
ternity or legitimation.
This new family dynamic holds broad and profound implications.
Regardless of the exact action taken by the legislature, this issue is not
going to go away. Rosero is the current decisional law. Yet, the gen-
eral assembly is encouraged to review the paternity and legitimation
statutes in a comprehensive manner. An ideal review and statutory
approach will: 1) clearly cover the field and allow for a stated compre-
hensive scheme for legitimation and paternity actions and proceed-
ings, 2) limit paternity and legitimation challenges in the courts by
clarifying or eliminating the distinction, 3) prevent the children from
becoming public charges, 4) specifically set forth all applicable paren-
tal rights, and 5) work in the best interest of the children. The Court
in Rosero made an effort to meet all five of these objectives when it
applied the "best interest of the child" standard; and the legislature is
encouraged to implement a statutory scheme that will provide statu-
tory direction to those coming after Rosero. Whether the legislative
action involves repeals, modifications, amendments, and/or new legis-
lation, the action should result in a fair, reasonable and just statutory
scheme that can be relied upon by putative fathers, acknowledged fa-
thers, mothers and illegitimate children throughout North Carolina
for years to come.
94. See CLARK, supra note 92.
95. Id.
2004]
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